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* * * 
Abstract: The Needham Question (i.e. the question why modern science 
has not developed in Chinese civilization but only in Europe) has drawn 
a substantial amount of criticism. Despite its apparent innocuousness, 
influential sinologists have written devastating critiques of it. These criti-
cisms fall into two main categories. The first denies the validity of the 
central concepts by means of which the question is formulated (e.g. 
‛science’ or ‛civilization’). The second calls into question (1) the legitima-
cy of asking for explanations of absences (i.e. of events that did not occur), 
(2) the legitimacy of citing absences as explanations (i.e. citing negative 
facts in explanations), and (3) whether the Needham question can be 
answered, even if asking for explanations of absences and citing absences 
as explanations are both legitimate. In this article, we take into account 
the former criticism, in order to arrive at a new starting point: dividing 
the Needham Problem into its various sub-questions. We then tackle the 
latter criticism by calling upon the contemporary philosophy of causation. 
We will argue that, according to certain theories of causation, the sub-
questions under discussion can be answered, and we will clarify how 
they can be argued for. 
                                                           
∗
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Joseph Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China is deeply admired by 
sinologists and historians of science. Nevertheless, the question that led 
Needham to study the history of Chinese science has drawn a substantial 
amount of criticism. This question, known as ‘Needham’s Grand Ques-
tion’, but also simply as ‘the Needham Question’ or ‘the Scientific Revo-
lution Problem’, initially appears rather innocuous: Needham considered 
the essential problem to be “that of why modern science had not devel-
oped in Chinese civilization (or Indian) but only in Europe?” In addition, 
he sought an explanation for China’s greater technological efficiency 
(compared to Europe) before the development of modern science.1 Need-
ham sought these explanations predominantly in so-called ‘inhibiting 
factors’, which effectively prevented a rise of modern science in China.2 
There is no truly standardized form of Needham’s Grand Question, but 
the one listed above contains most of its notable (and controversial) fea-
tures.3 
Despite its apparent innocuousness, influential sinologists have writ-
ten devastating critiques of this ‘Scientific Revolution Problem’. Nathan 
Sivin, Angus Graham and Roger Hart have all identified flaws in the 
assumptions behind the question.4 Sivin and Graham question (1) the 
legitimacy of asking for explanations of absences (i.e. of events that did 
not occur), (2) the legitimacy of citing absences as explanations (i.e. citing 
negative facts in explanations), and (3) whether the Needham question 
can be answered, even if asking for explanations of absences and citing 
absences as explanations are both legitimate. Roger Hart takes another 
approach: influenced by developments in the general history of science, 
he denies the validity of the central concepts of Needham’s Question: 
‘science’ and ‘civilization’. 
In general, philosophers of science can set themselves different aims 
when investigating a scientific practice (in this case: the practice of histo-
rians that try to answer Needham’s question). They can criticize the prac-
tice (show that it is problematic), defend it against criticism put forward 
by other scientists or philosophers (show that the practice is legitimate, 
contrary to what others say), and they can try to improve the practice (by 
formulating suggestions on how to tackle the problems). In this paper we 
will do the first two things. Firstly, we will summarize Roger Hart’s cri-
tique, in order to arrive at a new starting point. We will argue that his 
                                                           
1 Needham, 1972, p. 190. 
2 Needham, 1954. 
3 Sometimes, the Needham Question is also taken to include the converse of 
this question—i.e. why China was technologically superior to Europe in earlier 
times. However, this question will not be discussed here. 
4 Graham, 1973; Sivin, 2005; Hart, 1999. 
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approach leads one to abandon the larger question in favor of a myriad 
of sub-questions. That is the critical part of the paper. Secondly, we will 
investigate whether these sub-questions can be answered keeping the 
critiques of Sivin and Graham in mind. In our attempt to resolve the 
problem of absences as explananda or explanans, we will call upon the 
contemporary philosophy of causation. Thereby, we hope to avoid a 
number of pitfalls that can result from an unclear understanding of what 
precisely a cause is. We will use two types of causation theories: produc-
tion theories of causation and difference-making theories of causation. We will 
argue that, according to theories of the second type, the sub-questions 
under discussion can be answered. That is the defensive part of the paper, 
where we show that the practice of investigating the sub-questions is 
legitimate. The defensive part of the paper also contains a section on how 
to argue for the causal claims that occur in the explanations. In order to 
show that the practice of investigating the sub-questions is legitimate we 
should not only clarify the meaning of the causal claims used in the ex-
planations, we also have to clarify how they can be argued for. 
1. Fragmenting the Problem 
In its original form, Needham’s Grand Question makes a number of sig-
nificant assumptions about the proper units of historical analysis. The 
question is predicated on the acceptance of the concepts of ‘science’ and 
‘civilization’. By drawing upon constructivist studies of science, Roger 
Hart has argued that both of these concepts are very difficult to define or 
even circumscribe.5 This renders the Needham problem a bad question. 
Hart remarks that historical work using the term ‘science’ has often 
left that word undefined, as though the existence and use of the concept 
were sufficient proof of its historical validity and coherence. Some au-
thors have referenced a ‘scientific methodology’ or claimed one particu-
lar aspect of science to be the essence of science. Axiomatization and de-
duction are favorite choices for this claim. Hart argues that these choices 
are based on selective readings of a number of influential scholars (in-
cluding the Greeks, Galileo, Descartes, Bacon and Newton). Contrary to 
such claims, “there are good reasons to believe that the required defini-
tion of science cannot in fact be made.”6 A definition of science would 
have to carry within itself a demarcation criterion—a criterion to deter-
mine what is science and what is not. In order for the definition to be 
adequate, this criterion must be valid both transhistorically and transcul-
turally. Hart undermines the possibility of such a definition by drawing 
upon the work of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty and 
                                                           
5 Hart, 1999. 
6 Hart, 1999, p. 92. 
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Willard V. O. Quine.7 This point is no longer disputed in the history of 
science; it has been particularly influential in the constructivist tradition.8 
However, even though ‘science’ cannot be characterized more rigidly 
than as a family resemblance, it is possible to identify a number of key 
elements of science as it has played a role in society. In order to do this, 
one would need to point out the rapid social, technological and concep-
tual developments in Europe. Over the course of four centuries, (1) scien-
tists have established themselves as almost irrefutable intellectual author-
ities across the world, (2) inventions such as antibiotics, the nuclear bomb 
and the internet have changed the face of the earth, and (3) the conceptu-
al frameworks of the sciences have been (and still are) altering faster than 
they ever have before. The supposition that Needham’s Grand Question 
concerns these developments is what makes it so interesting. If modern 
science had not had such a grand impact on the entire world, it would 
never have drawn so much historical attention. The problem remains 
quite similar to the one Joseph Needham found himself engaged with 
many decades ago. What demanded explanation then, and what still 
demands explanation now, is the unseen degree of social, technological 
and conceptual change in Europe in comparison to China. (Of course, the 
notion of modern science discussed here is the form of science historical-
ly developed in Europe; we do not presume to declare it the only form of 
modern science possible.) 
If it is impossible to draw upon a unitary concept of science or a mon-
olithic Western or Chinese culture, an explanation of these social, concep-
tual and technological developments becomes far more complex. Then, 
among other things, it becomes necessary to determine how social posi-
tions, institutions, technologies, methodologies and conceptual frame-
works have developed, and explain how these have contributed to later 
developments. Among other things, these questions will concern the 
origins of gentlemen-scientists, scientific societies, the telescope, con-
trolled experiment and the mathematical approach to the study of nature. 
Needham’s question is thus fragmented into questions of the form ‘Why 
was [a specific, well-definable9 social position, institution, technology, 
methodology or conceptual framework] developed in Europe, but not in 
China?’ A similar suggestion is made by Mark Elvin: 
It is drawing attention to a method that offers a fruitful 
way of disaggregating a question into more manageable 
                                                           
7  Hart cites Feyerabend, 1988; Kuhn, 1970; Rorty, 1991; Quine, 1961; and 
Quine, 1991. 
8 Two excellent overviews of this tradition are found in Pestre, 1995, and 
Golinski, 2005. 
9 Hart, 1999, p. 92. 
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subquestions, namely how far premodern Chinese 
thinkers had developed the various styles of thinking 
that have in the long run, as they have combined with 
each other, proved crucial to the growth of a distinctive-
ly ‘modern’ science.10 
Mark Elvin bases his approach on the ‘styles of scientific thinking’ found 
in Crombie (1994); his examples of methodological innovations include 
hypothetical modeling, the probabilistic style of reasoning, the experi-
mental style of reasoning, taxonomy, etc.11 In the following sections, we 
will investigate the legitimacy of questions of the form described above. 
Hart’s conceptual deconstruction is not limited to ‘science’ alone; he 
also undermines the concept of ‘civilization’. If there are such “suprahis-
torical entities called civilizations”, then in order to define them, it would 
be necessary to identify essential features of these civilizations, which 
must have remained constant over time. For instance, if there is such a 
thing as European civilization as usually defined, its features would have 
to be shared between ancient Greece and, for instance, early modern Italy. 
Given that this is quite unlikely, civilization is not a proper unit of analy-
sis for historical inquiry.12 Two answers present themselves to this prob-
lem: civilizations can either be viewed as family resemblances, or re-
duced to mere geographical locations. 
If one views civilizations as family resemblances in a way similar to 
the above approach to science, the essentialist connotations of the word 
vanish. However, it also makes the Needham problem incredibly difficult 
to pose, as it makes “Chinese civilization” and “European civilization” 
very vague entities.  
However, by replacing civilizations with mere geographical locations, 
one can avoid this debate. Rather than discussing ‘Western civilization’ 
or ‘Chinese civilization’, one can merely talk about Europe and China. 
While geographical borders are fluid, the two regions can be sufficiently 
distinguished so as to not form a problem for Needham’s Grand Ques-
tion.13 
                                                           
10 Elvin 2004, p. xxviii. 
11 It is important that these social positions, institutions, technologies, meth-
odologies and conceptual frameworks must be of a level that is sufficiently specif-
ic to define properly, but remains sufficiently vague as to not be too specific to 
one particular culture. Crombie’s examples (upon which Elvin draws) provide a 
good middle ground. 
12 Hart, 1999, pp. 90-93. 
13 To a certain degree, such a geographical redefinition might even be unnec-
essary, as Mark Elvin has argued. While civilizations vary strongly over time due 
to both internal developments and external interactions, the same is the case for 
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2. Causation and Absences 
Given the problems with the concept of ‘science’, we have abandoned 
that term in favor of more easily defined concepts such as ‘the mathe-
matization of nature’ and ‘controlled experiment’. While these terms still 
describe a variety of different practices, such concepts are far more co-
herent than ‘science’, and can be circumscribed relatively clearly. It then 
remains to be seen whether or not the structural critiques of Sivin and 
Graham apply to these questions—and if so, to what extent.  
Graham and Sivin question a fundamental presupposition of the Sci-
entific Revolution Problem. They do not believe that it is legitimate to ask 
why China did not have a Scientific Revolution: they deny the validity of 
causation by absence and causation of absences. The reasoning behind 
this skepticism towards absences applies to our sub-questions about as-
pects of science just as it applies to the question about the Scientific Revo-
lution as a whole. In order to determine whether their skepticism is war-
ranted, we will analyze these sub-questions in terms of the contemporary 
philosophy of causation.  
Historians rarely render their concepts of causation explicit. Usually, 
such an explicit definition is irrelevant to their trade. In a discussion of 
the possibility of answering a particular causal question, however, an 
explication of these concepts is worthwhile. After all, not all historians 
refer to the same concept when they discuss causation.14 
Philosophers of causation have developed many theories of causation. 
For our purposes, they can be grouped into process theories of causation 
(also known as production theories) and difference-making theories of 
causation (the latter group includes probabilistic theories, counterfactual 
theories and certain regularity theories). The content of some of these 
theories will be explained in the sections that follow. What is important 
now is that we regard these theories as tools for analyzing scientific prac-
tice: philosophy of causation as it has been practiced during the last dec-
ades has resulted in a well-filled toolbox which we can now use to ana-
                                                                                                                                   
individuals, who also change continually under these influences. Therefore, Elvin 
concludes that writing on the history of a civilization need not be any more prob-
lematic than writing a biography; Mark Elvin, personal communication, 2011. 
14 Frank Ankersmit has voiced discontent about the fact that contemporary 
philosophers of history are not conversant with the terms of the contemporary 
philosophy of science; see Ankersmit, 2005. Anton Froeyman has expanded on 
this argument in Froeyman, 2009, in which he also describes which theories of 
causation are best fit for which types of historiographical work. 
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lyze historical practice, more precisely the practice of answering the sub-
questions of the Scientific Revolution Problem.15 
In the next two sections, we will try to clarify what type of causation 
can be involved if an historian of sciences puts forward a causal claim as 
an answer to a sub-question originating from Needham’s Grand Ques-
tion. Clarifying which concept of causation is used is helpful in two ways: 
(1) it becomes clear what the meaning of the causal claims is, and (2) by 
further clarifying precisely what is asked for, one can learn the type and 
extent of argumentation and evidence required to justify the answer to 
the question. 
Many of Needham’s critics have taken the presupposed fact that ques-
tions involving absences cannot be answered as one of the greatest flaws 
of the Needham Problem—and hence of the sub-questions described 
above. If, however, it can be shown that these questions can be answered 
properly for one (or more) coherent account(s) of causation, then this 
critique falls dead in its tracks—even if another account of causation 
might leave these questions unanswerable. 
3. Causation as Production 
Proponents of production or process theories, the most influential of 
which are Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe, generally defend them as fun-
damental accounts of causation—purportedly, they describe causation as 
it exists in the external world.16 Insofar as other causal claims are true, 
they are so only because they supervene on a description of a causal pro-
cess. 
The idea for causal processes originated with Wesley Salmon, but Phil 
Dowe’s version is now more influential. Therefore, we shall begin with a 
short description of Dowe’s theory. According to Dowe, “for there to be 
causation, there must be a set of causal processes and interactions, under-
stood in terms of conserved quantities linking a cause with its effect.” He 
defines causal processes and interactions as follows: “A causal process is 
a world-line of an object that possesses a conserved quantity.” And 
“A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines that involves ex-
change of a conserved-quantity.”17 A world-line is the collection of points 
on a space-time diagram representing the history of an object. An object 
can be anything found in the ontology of science (particles, waves, 
fields, …) or common sense (chairs, buildings, people, …). A conserved 
                                                           
15 See Hall, 2006; De Vreese, 2006; and Weber and De Vreese, 2009, for more 
on this approach to the philosophy of causation. 
16 See Salmon, 1984, and Dowe, 2000. 
17 Dowe, 2004, p. 189. 
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quantity “is any quantity that is governed by a conservation law, and 
current scientific theory is our best guide as to what these are.”18 
 
Dowe’s reliance on conserved quantities indicates his focus on the physi-
cal sciences. Regardless of its merits, it is not applicable to historiograph-
ical inquiry. While Salmon’s theory is characterized by an intent to model 
the physical sciences as well, it can be applied just as easily to the bio-
medical sciences, the social sciences and historiographical inquiry.19 We 
present a slightly adapted version of Salmon’s first theory.20 According to 
this theory, there are two essential aspects to causation: the innovative 
aspect (the acquisition of new properties) and the conservative aspect 
(properties are preserved). The first is accounted for by the concept of 
‘causal interaction’, while the second is accounted for by the concept of 
‘causal process’. Let us start with causal interaction: 
 
(CI) At t there is a causal interaction between objects x and y if and only if 
(1) there is an intersection between x and y at t (i.e. they are in 
adjacent or identical spatial regions at t), 
(2) x exhibits a characteristic P’ in an interval immediately be-
fore t, but a modified characteristic P immediately after t, 
(3) y exhibits a characteristic Q’ in an interval immediately be-
fore t, but a modified characteristic Q immediately after t, 
(4) x would have had P’ immediately after t if the intersection 
would not have occurred, and 
(5) y would have had Q’ immediately after t if the intersection 
would not have occurred.  
 
While this definition incorporates most of the basic ideas of Salmon’s 
theory, it differs in one important point: Salmon’s original theory consid-
ers an interaction to occur between two causal processes, while this defi-
nition considers it to occur between two objects. Dowe suggested this 
modification.21 We follow this suggestion because it does not change the 
theory substantially (processes are world-lines of objects) and it makes 
the theory congruent with common sense ontology in which objects (ra-
ther than processes) are the basic entities. 
Now we turn to causal processes. Salmon divides processes (world-
lines of objects) into causal processes and pseudo-processes. Causal pro-
                                                           
18 Dowe, 2000, p. 91. 
19 See Weber, 2007. 
20 Salmon, 1984. 
21 Dowe, 1992. 
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cesses are capable of transmitting marks, pseudo-processes cannot 
transmit marks. Mark transmission is defined by Salmon as follows: 
Let P be a process that, in the absence of interactions 
with other processes, would remain uniform with re-
spect to characteristic Q, which it would manifest con-
sistently over an interval that includes both of the 
space-time points A and B (A≠B). Then a mark (consist-
ing of a modification of Q into Q′, which has been in-
troduced into process P by means of a single local in-
teraction at point A, is transmitted to point B if P mani-
fests the modification Q′ at B and at all stages of the 
process between A and B without additional interven-
tions.22  
An example of a process is the movement of a material object. Moreover, 
it is a causal process: the underlying object has a capacity to transmit 
marks. But the material object itself is not a causal process, since it is not a 
process. The movement of an object is a causal process, but the moving 
object itself is not. 
By means of the concepts of causal interaction and causal process it is 
possible to model certain types of historical claims quite adequately. An-
ton Froeyman has argued that causal process theories such as this one are 
good models of causation as it is used in historical narratives. By histori-
cal narratives, Froeyman means historical work characterized by the fol-
lowing four features: causal coherence, having a definite beginning and 
ending, a ‘plot’ and a central subject. Clarifying the concept of ‘causal 
coherence’, he says “a series of descriptive statements is coherent because 
every statement is the effect of the one it immediately follows.” Thus, “a 
narrative forms what can be described as a ‘causal chain‘.”23 He follows 
Hayden White in defining a plot as “a structure of relationships by which 
the events contained in the account are endowed with a meaning by be-
ing identified as parts of an integrated whole.”24 The other two features 
are sufficiently clear. Froeyman has emphasized that three of the four 
features of narratives are shared by causal processes: “both causal pro-
cesses and narratives need some kind of ‘central subject‘ or ‘object‘ which 
remains constant throughout the development of the process. (…) causal 
processes also have something of a plot. (…) The only difference between 
(historical) narratives and causal processes seems to be that causal pro-
cesses do not seem to require a definite ending and a beginning.”25 There-
                                                           
22 Salmon, 1984, p. 148. 
23 Froeyman, 2009, p. 121. Froeyman references: Dray, 1971, p. 162. 
24 White, 1973, p. 9. 
25 Froeyman, 2009, pp. 121-122. 
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fore, Froeyman concludes that historical narratives are a subset of causal 
processes. 
As process theories provide a good model for causation as used in his-
torical narratives, they are adequate to explicate the meaning of causal 
claims which historians put forward as answers to questions of the struc-
ture ‘Why was [a specific, well-definable social position, institution, tech-
nology, methodology or conceptual framework] developed in Europe?’, 
which is the first part of the questions we are concerned with. These 
questions were of the form ‘Why was [a specific, well-definable social 
position, institution, technology, methodology or conceptual framework] 
developed in Europe, but not in China?’ It remains to be seen whether or 
not causal process theories can provide a good model for analysing the 
meaning of answers to questions of the form ‘Why was [a specific, well-
definable social position, institution, technology, methodology or concep-
tual framework] not developed in China?’ We argue that the answer to 
this is negative. The reason is that, according to causal process theories, 
prevention and omission are not causation. 
Ned Hall has argued elaborately that to assume otherwise leads to 
several conflicts within one’s theory of causation. He invokes the follow-
ing example: 
Suzy and Billy have grown up, just in time to get in-
volved in World War III. Suzy is piloting a bomber on a 
mission to blow up an enemy target, and Billy is pilot-
ing a fighter as her lone escort. Along comes an enemy 
fighter plane, piloted by Enemy. Sharp-eyed Billy spots 
Enemy, zooms in, pulls the trigger, and Enemy’s plane 
goes down in flames. Suzy’s mission is undisturbed, 
and the bombing takes place as planned. If Billy hadn’t 
pulled the trigger, Enemy would have eluded him and 
shot down Suzy, and the bombing would not have 
happened.26 
Billy’s pulling the trigger did not produce the bombing, rather it neutral-
ized a state-of-affairs that would have prevented the effect from occur-
ring. The occurrence of the bombing was dependent on Billy’s pulling the 
trigger, but not produced by it. In this example, the effect counterfactual-
ly depends on the cause, but there is no mechanism linking cause and 
effect. Counterfactual dependence “seems to be the only appropriate causal 
relation for such ‘negative events’ to stand in.”27 
Interpreted from the point of view of production, causes must pro-
duce a positive fact, and only positive facts can cause anything at all. 
                                                           
26 Hall, 2004, p. 241. 
27 Hall, 2004, p. 256. 
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Therefore, if one wants to interpret answers to the sub-questions of 
Needham’s Grand Question as referring to causation as production, one 
runs into difficulties: there are no chains of causal processes and causal 
interactions leading to ‘something not coming to pass’. If causation is 
understood in this sense, Graham and Sivin’s point stands: one does not 
investigate why something failed to occur. When causation is understood 
as production, one must only consider positive facts as causes or effects. 
Rather than asking why a particular social position, institution, technolo-
gy, methodology or conceptual framework was not adopted in China, 
one must ask why another was adopted. If causation is interpreted from 
the point of view of causal process theories, one can give an answer to 
questions like ‘how did it come to be that astronomical practices in China 
were purely instrumentalist?’ or ‘how was controlled experiment devel-
oped in Europe?’ One cannot answer questions like ‘why were astronom-
ical practices in Europe not purely instrumentalist?’ or ‘why was con-
trolled experiment not developed in China? 
4. Causation as Difference-Making 
Difference-making theories start from the idea that a cause somehow 
makes a positive difference for its effect. This idea can be elaborated in 
different ways. On the one hand, there is John Mackie’s INUS account in 
which the difference-making idea is combined with the idea that there is 
always a regularity under which a causal relation can be subsumed.28 On 
the other hand we have probabilistic and counterfactual approaches, 
which do not presuppose an overarching regularity. 
We will use Ronald Giere’s probabilistic theory here as a tool for our 
analysis. This theory defines causation on the level of populations. While 
the theory can be extended to various types of variables, Giere presents a 
version of his theory that only considers binary variables. Therefore, in 
what follows, C is a variable with two values (C and Not-C), and so is E 
(with values E and Not-E). Giere then defines causation in populations as 
follows:  
“C is a positive causal factor for E in the population U 
whenever PX(E) is greater than PK(E). 
C is a negative causal factor for E in the population U when-
ever PX(E) is less than PK(E). 
C is causally irrelevant for E in the population U whenever 
PX(E) is equal to PK(E).”29 
                                                           
28 Mackie, 1974. 
29 Giere, 1997, p. 204. 
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X is the hypothetical population which is obtained by changing, for every 
member of U that exhibits the value Not-C, the value into C. K is the 
analogous hypothetical population in which all individuals that exhibit C 
are changed into Not-C. PX(E) and PK(E) are the probability of E in re-
spectively X and K. Probabilities are defined as relative frequencies 
(Giere takes U to be finite, i.e. causal claims are about finite populations). 
An example might clarify this. If we claim that smoking (C) is a 
positive causal factor for lung cancer (E) in the Belgian population (U), 
this amounts to claiming that if every inhabitant of Belgium were forced 
to smoke there would be more lung cancers in Belgium than if everyone 
were forbidden to smoke. The converse is the case for the claim that 
smoking is a negative causal factor. Causal irrelevance is a relation 
between variables (represented in bold) rather than a relation between 
values of a variable (like the first two relations). If we claim that 
“smoking behavior” (C) is causally irrelevant for “the occurrence or 
absence of lung cancer” (E) this means that we believe that in the two 
hypothetical populations the incidence of lung cancer is equally high. 
There is no reason why absences cannot be causes according to Giere’s 
probabilistic account. Traditionally, it has been claimed that the lack of 
the notion of a divine lawgiver was one of the reasons why modern sci-
ence did not originate in China. We have indicated our reasons for not 
asking about the origins of modern science above, and hence, we shall 
instead consider the more humble claim: “the lack of idea of a divine 
lawgiver was a reason for the absence of the notion of laws of nature in 
China.”30 
A Gierean claim that is relevant in this case is: C (= the notion of a di-
vine lawgiver) is a positive causal factor for E (= the notion of fixed laws 
of nature). This reduces to: ‘in X (= a population where everybody be-
lieves in a divine lawgiver), there will be more individuals who believe in 
fixed laws of nature than in K (= a population where nobody believes in a 
divine lawgiver).’ This, in turn, means that the absence of the notion of a 
divine lawgiver is a negative causal factor for the idea of fixed laws of 
nature. That is so because, in general, Giere’s theory has the property that 
if C is a positive causal factor for E in U, not-C is a negative casual factor 
for E in U (this property follows logically from the definitions). It is there-
                                                           
30 Our sole concern in this example is the form of the question; we do not 
claim that the absence of a divine lawgiver is or is not a cause of the Scientific 
Revolution or one of its constitutive parts. Elvin (personal communication, 2011) 
has noted that the current argument concerning divine lawgivers is more compli-
cated, and has pointed out that it is treated more thoroughly in the contributions 
of Elvin and Harbsmeier in Vogel and Dux, 2010. The above example is simpli-
fied and is provided only to illustrate how Giere’s theory can be applied to the 
Needham Problem. 
De Saeger & Weber: Needham’s Grand Question Revisited                               25 
 
fore clear that absences do not behave any differently from positive caus-
es in this theory. 
This reconstruction in terms of Giere’s theory does not suffice to make 
the sub-questions legitimate. We also have to show that it is possible to 
give good arguments for such claims. That will be done in the next sec-
tion. Hence, we now shift our attention from the meaning of the causal 
claims to the way they can be argued for. 
5. Arguing for Probabilistic Causal Claims 
In the biomedical sciences, Gierean causal claims about populations are 
supported or rejected on the basis of randomized experiments (e.g. tests 
of the efficiency of drugs) or prospective or retrospective studies (e.g. 
epidemiological research into the causes of diseases). The same goes for 
the social sciences (e.g. pilot studies to tests the efficiency of social policy 
measures, and prospective/retrospective studies investigating the causes 
of certain social phenomena). These methods are not available when we 
try to answer sub-questions of the Needham question. What we need 
here is a historical thought experiment. 
 While one cannot use thought experiments to estimate PX(E)or PK(E) 
quantitatively with any degree of precision, one can establish relatively 
convincingly whether PX(E) is larger than, smaller than, or equal to PK(E). 
To illustrate this, consider the following claim: 
The Japanese irrigation projects in the 1930s in Taiwan 
caused a breakdown of the joint-family system in rural 
areas of the island. 
As it stands, this is not a claim about a causal relation in a population in 
Giere’s sense. There is a population (Taiwanese peasants in the 1930s) 
and the effect variable (being part of a nuclear family or being part of an 
extended family) is a property that every person in the population has. 
The problem is the cause variable. If we equate this with “the perception 
of living in a country with a reliable supply”, it fits Giere’s scheme. By 
equating these two causes, it is assumed that these members know that 
there is an irrigation network, and that they take that into account in their 
decision making. In this way, the initial causal claim is what we would 
call “probabilified”: it is given a probabilistic interpretation. This inter-
pretation can be stated as follows: 
The perception of reliable water supply by the peasants 
in Taiwan in the 1930s caused a breakdown of the joint-
family system in rural areas of the island. 
Probabilification has an important advantage: we can set up a thought 
experiment to support the claim. Let us see how this works. Our example 
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is taken from Little (1991, p. 141), who, in turn, relies on Pasternak (1978). 
Till 1930, a joint-family system was dominant in rural areas of Taiwan: 
parents and married sons continued to live together and farm their hold-
ings together, rather than dividing into two or more nuclear families. 
From 1930 on, there is a continuing trend toward divided families. Pas-
ternak explains this change in family structure as a rational adaptation to 
a change in circumstances of the rural economy: the availability of relia-
ble irrigation water. Indeed, Taiwan was invaded by Japan, and the Japa-
nese established large-scale irrigation projects in the 1930s. An adherent 
of this explanation must accept one of the causal claims above. 
Whether we accept this claim (in its probabilistic interpretation) or not 
depends on our answer to the following question: 
 
(I?) What would have happened if the Japanese had irrigated half of 
Taiwan, and randomly distributed the farmers over the irrigated and 
non-irrigated parts. 
 
We call questions like this one ‘experimental questions’, because they ask 
what would happen if a randomised experiment were performed. Some 
of the possible answers to this specific question are: 
 
(I-) The irrigated part and non-irrigated part would have evolved 
identically with respect to family structure. 
(I+) The irrigated part would have evolved towards nuclear family 
more rapidly than the non-irrigated part. 
(I++) The irrigated part would have evolved towards nuclear family; 
the non-irrigated part not.  
 
Obviously, (I-) leads to the rejection of the claim, while the (I+) and (I++) 
support the claim. 
Suppose we want to do a real randomized experiment to test these 
claims. Then we will have two problems. First, and one can hardly over-
estimate the importance hereof for historiography, we are too late: the 
appropriate experiment (involving actual division into irrigated and non-
irrigated parts, and random division of all Taiwanese peasant over the 
two parts) was in principle possible 70 years ago, but now it is too late. 
The second problem is that actually performing the experiment would be 
unethical. 
In many cases in which, for some reason, real experiments are impos-
sible, thought experiments can offer a way out. They allow us to answer 
experimental questions without actually realising the experimental nor 
the control group. In the Taiwan example, (I+) can be supported by the 
following argument: 
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(1) In both parts (irrigated and non-irrigated) an equally substantial 
part of the population makes rational decisions about family structure. 
(2) In both parts, normal friction in social life (e.g., between sisters-in-
law) occurs often and with equal frequency. 
(3) In the irrigated part, farmers are convinced that the irrigation sys-
tem protects them against crop failure due to drought. 
(4) In the non-irrigated part, farmers know that, in a nuclear family 
system, their rice crop will fail (due to insufficient labour supply) if 
there is less than 15 days of consecutive rainfall. 
(5) In the non-irrigated part, farmers know, in a joint family system, 
their rice crop will fail (due to insufficient labour supply) if there is 
less than 10 days of consecutive rainfall. 
(6) Periods of more than 10 but less than 15 days of consecutive rain-
fall occur often. 
 Conclusion 
(I+) The irrigated part evolves towards nuclear family more rapidly 
than the non-irrigated part. 
 
In this argument, we reason with imaginary cases: both the experimental 
and control group are virtual, and we argue about what would happen if 
they were real. But there is an important difference between the groups: 
the characteristic property of the experimental group (irrigation) was 
present in the real world. We will come back to this immediately. 
Answering an experimental question without actually realizing the 
experimental nor the control group is possible because of the ‘bottom-up’ 
approach: we start from assumptions about how rational decision mak-
ing and/or irrational psychological mechanisms determine the behavior 
of individuals in a social group. Then the assumptions are used to infer a 
causal relation at the higher level, the level of the population. This micro-
reduction is the surrogate that is used for observations in the experimental 
and in the control group. Historical thought experiments can work in 
principle because they use this surrogate. More precisely, the way is as 
follows: 
(1) We know what would happen in the experimental group, because 
its characteristic property has been present in the real world: the result 
in the experimental group would be the same as in the real world (e.g. 
evolution towards nuclear family). 
(2) We do not know why this result occurred in the real world, only 
that it occurred. 
(3) We try to find out which mechanism produced the result in the re-
al world (and thus would produce the result in the experimental 
group). 
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(4) We use this mechanism to argue that the result would be different 
in the control group. 
In order to avoid misunderstanding, there are a few points we want to 
stress. First of all, the example we have given involves rational decision 
making (i.e. people take into account the consequences of their actions). 
However, there is no reason to exclude other mechanisms—e.g. norm 
guided behavior—which also make the average behavior of the popula-
tion predictable. For instance, a thought experiment could start from the 
assumption that all or most people behave in accordance with the role 
expectations attached to their social roles. Second, not all thought exper-
iments which use the trick of probabilification are equally good. The 
quality of such thought experiments is a gradual matter, influenced 
mainly by two factors: 
(1) The strength of the assumptions. A thought experiment that uses 
strong rationality assumptions (e.g. perfect information about the 
market, perfect insight in economic theory, perfect and extremely 
quick calculations) is far less convincing than a thought experiment 
which uses weak rationality assumptions (e.g. the assumption that 
individuals somehow take into account the consequences of their ac-
tions) because it is much more likely that a large majority of the pop-
ulation satisfies the weak assumptions. 
(2) The size of the population. The bigger the population, the less the ef-
fect a deviant individual has on the average behavior of the group. 
We conclude that it is in principle possible to answer questions of the 
form ‘Why was [a specific, well-definable social position, institution, 
technology, methodology or conceptual framework] developed in Eu-
rope, but not in China?’, provided that these answers can be translated 
into claims about populations. And when arguing for an answer one is 
confronted with two additional issues:  
(1) Can one establish sufficiently weak assumptions that make the 
average behavior of the group predictable? 
(2) Is the population sufficiently large? 
The extent to which these conditions are fulfilled is a variable matter, and 
might differ significantly for different sub-questions of the Scientific 
Revolution Problem. Nonetheless, there is no principal reason why they 
cannot be answered. A. C. Graham (1973) once suggested that while it is 
possible to identify the absence of snow as an inhibiting factor for the 
invention of skis, it is impossible to identify inhibiting factors for the 
developments of modern science. We will see whether or not that is the 
case in the following conclusion, but we have established that there is no 
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reason to accept this claim for the sub-questions of Needham’s Grand 
Question, and have indicated how this identification is possible. 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
We have agreed with Roger Hart in claiming that terms such as ‘science’, 
‘modern science’ and ‘civilization’ are improper concepts for historio-
graphical inquiry. Reacting to this, we pondered whether certain sub-
questions are conceptually sound—that is, whether or not a concept of 
causation can be found by which these questions can be answered. We 
proposed to fragment Needham’s question into questions of the form 
‘Why was [a specific, well-definable social position, institution, technolo-
gy, methodology or conceptual framework] developed in Europe, but not 
in China?’ We have found that, if one understands causation as produc-
tion, one cannot answer these questions properly. However, if one un-
derstands causation as difference-making (more specifically: as probabil-
istic causation in populations in the way defined by Ronald Giere), there 
is no principal reason why these questions cannot be answered—
although practical considerations might interfere. We have explained 
how claims put forward as answers to these sub-questions can be justi-
fied. 
One might wonder whether Needham’s Grand Question can be rede-
fined as a conjunction of its sub-questions, which, as we have seen, can be 
answered. If one were to redefine Needham’s Grand Question in terms of 
its constituent sub-questions, the question would have to refer to causes 
interpreted as difference-making, as that is the only sense by which they 
are answerable. However, as there is no clear definition of ‘science’, any 
conjunction of sub-questions will fall short. For instance, answering the 
question ‘Why did Europe develop controlled experiment, the mathemat-
ical approach to nature and the concept of laws of nature, while China 
did not?’ is possible. However, if one abbreviates this to ‘Why was mod-
ern science developed in Europe, but not in China’, one postulates an 
arbitrary, a-historical definition of modern science. There is no exhaustive 
list of sub-questions to which it can be reduced. And without an exhaus-
tive list of such sub-questions, one cannot construct the thought experi-
ments required to establish the answer to the total question. Therefore, 
the Needham Question, as originally formulated by Needham, cannot be 
answered. 
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